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The relevance of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates for the conduct
of monetary policy is a much debated issue among both policymakers and acad-
emics. Clearly, the economic experience of Japan during the last decade as well
as the low levels of nominal interest rates prevailing in Europe and the United
States contribute to the renewed interest in this topic.1 Although deﬂation-
ary pressures seem eventually to be subsiding, investigating this issue remains
relevant for eﬀectively dealing with such pressures should they reemerge.
Surprisingly, however, a systematic investigation of the policy implications
arising from the lower bound in stochastic models with forward-looking agents
is not available yet. This paper determines discretionary monetary policy in
a benchmark New Keynesian model, featuring monopolistic competition and
sticky prices in the product market (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) and
Woodford (2003)), under standard conditions of uncertainty and taking explic-
itly into account the existence of the lower bound.
Studying a fully stochastic setup with lower bound is of interest because it
allows us to calibrate the model, to the U.S. economy, and study the welfare im-
plications of discretionary monetary policy. In particular, comparing our results
to those obtained under commitment in Adam and Billi (2004), we illustrate
that ignoring the existence of the lower bound one may signiﬁcantly understate
the value of policy commitment.
Analyzing a purely forward-looking model, we show that under discretionary
monetary policy a fall in the natural real rate of interest generates large output
losses and a sizable amount of deﬂation.2 In particular, for our benchmark
calibration a negative three standard deviation value of the natural real rate
leads to an output gap of about -8% and an annual rate of inﬂation around
1For recent discussions see Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003), Coenen and Wieland (2003),
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and Svensson (2003).
2The ‘natural’ real rate of interest is the real interest rate that renders the allocation in
the sticky price economy identical to the eﬃcient allocation.
1-1.8%.3 The fall in both output and inﬂation is found to be considerably larger
than in the case with policy commitment and does not show up at all if the
model ignores the existence of the lower bound. In fact, under commitment
output falls by less than 2% and inﬂation by less than 0.1%.
As a result, the unconditional welfare losses generated by discretionary pol-
icy increase markedly if the model takes into account the lower bound. For our
benchmark calibration the welfare equivalent consumption losses generated by
discretionary policy increase by about 65%. However, we ﬁnd that depending
on the precise parameterization of the model the consumption losses may easily
increase by as much as 300%. The consumption losses generated by discre-
tionary policy increase even further if we depart from our fully forward-looking
speciﬁcation, allowing inﬂation to be partly determined by lagged inﬂation in
the Phillips curve (see Billi (2004) for the case with policy commitment).
Overall, these results emerge because in a fully stochastic setup private sec-
tor expectations of future output and inﬂation and the discretionary policy
response to these expectations reinforce each other, causing the lower bound to
be reached much more often than under commitment. Compared to the case
with commitment, the private sector expects larger output losses and stronger
deﬂation once the lower bound is reached: discretionary policy cannot engage
in credible promises about the conduct of future policy actions, therefore, it is
unable to lower real interest rates by promising future inﬂation.4 Since adverse
shocks may always cause the lower bound to be reached in the future, private
agents expect lower output and inﬂation even at times when nominal rates are
still positive. Reduced inﬂationary expectations increase real interest rates and
put downward pressure on actual output and inﬂation. This induces policy to
lower nominal rates, which causes the lower bound to be reached much earlier
than under commitment. This in turn justiﬁes even lower expectations of future
output and inﬂation and generates additional downward pressure on the actual
3The natural real rate then temporarily stands at -1.39%.
4Any monetary expansion implemented during a time of zero nominal rates is expected to
be reversed once the lower bound ceases to be binding, see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
2values of these variables.
The literature on monetary policy under discretion was initiated by the
seminal contributions of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon
(1983). More recently, it has been extended to fully micro-founded models
in Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003).5 The relevance of the zero
lower bound under discretionary policy was ﬁrst noted by Krugman (1998)
who emphasized that the credibility problem may generate a deﬂation problem.
Eggertsson (2005) and Jeanne and Svensson (2004) build upon this idea and
discuss potential solutions to the credibility problem.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the economic model and section 3 explains how we solve it. After presenting
the calibration to the U.S. economy in section 4, we illustrate the welfare impli-
cations of discretionary policy in section 5. To explain the welfare results, ﬁrst
we analytically determine the perfect foresight equilibrium in Section 6, then
we present detailed results for the stochastic equilibrium in Section 7. Section
8 checks the robustness of our ﬁndings with respect to the model speciﬁcation
and parameterization. Section 9 brieﬂy concludes. Analytical derivations and
our numerical algorithms are described in the appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a well-known monetary policy model of a representative consumer
and ﬁrms in monopolistic competition facing restrictions on the frequency of
price adjustments (Calvo (1983)). Following Rotemberg (1987), this is often
referred to as the ‘New Keynesian’ model, that has frequently been studied in
the literature, e.g., Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003).
We augment this otherwise standard monetary policy model by explicitly
imposing the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. We thus consider the
5Albanesi et al. (2003), and King and Wolman (2003) highlight that when monetary
authorities act under discretion multiple steady states may arise.
3following problem:
max
{yt,πt,it}
−Et
∞ X
i=0
β
i ¡
π2
t+i + λy2
t+i
¢
(1)
s.t.
πt = βEtπt+1 + κyt + ut (2)
yt = Etyt+1 − σ(it − Etπt+1)+gt (3)
it ≥− r∗ (4)
ut = ρuut−1 + εu,t (5)
gt = ρggt−1 + εg,t (6)
ut, gt given (7)
{yt+i,πt+i,i t+i} given for i ≥ 1 (8)
where πt denotes the inﬂation rate, yt the output gap, and it the nominal
interest rate expressed as deviation from the interest rate consistent with the
zero inﬂation steady state.
Under certain conditions the monetary policy objective (1) can be inter-
preted as a quadratic approximation to the utility of the representative house-
hold.6 The welfare weight λ>0 is then given by
λ =
κ
θ
where θ>1 denotes the price elasticity of demand for the goods produced by
monopolistic ﬁrms. Equation (2) is a forward-looking Phillips curve summariz-
ing, up to ﬁrst order, proﬁt-maximizing price setting behavior by ﬁrms, where
β ∈ (0,1) denotes the discount factor and κ>0 is given by
κ =
(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
α
σ−1 + ω
1+ωθ
6This requires steady output to be eﬃcient, e.g., thanks to the existence of an output
subsidy that neutralizes the distortions from monopolistic competition, and the output gap to
be deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the actual output level and the eﬃcient level, see chapter
6 of Woodford (2003) for details.
4with α ∈ (0,1) denoting the share of ﬁrms that cannot adjust prices in a given
period, σ>0 the household’s intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and ω>0
the elasticity of a ﬁrm’s real marginal costs with respect to its own output
level.7 Equation (3) is a linearized Euler equation summarizing, up to ﬁrst order,
households’ intertemporal maximization. The shock gt captures the variation
in the ‘natural’ real interest rate and is usually referred to as a real rate shock,
i.e.,
gt = σ(rt − r∗) (9)
w h e r et h en a t u r a lr e a lr a t ert is the real interest rate consistent with the ﬂexible
price equilibrium, and r∗ =1 /β − 1 is the real rate of the deterministic zero
inﬂation steady state.8 The requirement that nominal interest rates have to
remain positive is captured by constraint (4). Finally, equations (5) and (6)
describe the evolution of the shocks, where ρj ∈ (−1,1) and εj,t ∼ iiN(0,σ2
j)
for j = u,g.9
Assuming the monetary policymaker cannot commit to future plans, one
solves problem (1)-(8) on a period-by-period basis. In other terms, the poli-
cymaker rationally anticipates its inability to commit, therefore, treats future
values of y, π and i as given. This is captured by constraint (8). This is the
only point of departure from the case with policy commitment, where the entire
solution is determined in period zero, see Adam and Billi (2004).
One should note that (1)-(8) describes a social planning problem since in
addition to the nominal interest rate the policymaker also ‘chooses’ the preferred
output level and inﬂation rate. We thus implicitly allow the policymaker to
select the preferred equilibrium outcome consistent with discretionary monetary
policymaking. In this paper we do not discuss how policy can insure that the
7See chapter 3 in Woodford (2003) for further details.
8The shock gt summarizes all shocks that under ﬂexible prices generate time variation in the
real interest rate, therefore, it captures the combined eﬀects of preference shocks, productivity
shocks, and exogenous changes in government expenditure.
9As shown in Adam and Billi (2004), this speciﬁcation of the shock processes is suﬃciently
general to describe the historical sequence of shocks in the U.S. economy for the period 1983:1-
2002:4 that we consider.
5preferred outcome is indeed the only one consistent with the way interest rate
policy is conducted. This is a matter of policy implementation, which is beyond
the scope of this paper; the reader may want to refer to Giannoni and Woodford
(2003) for a treatment in the linear case.
2.1 Discussion
2.1.1 Relation to earlier work
The new feature of the discretionary maximization problem introduced in the
previous section is the presence of both the zero lower bound (4) and the sto-
chastic disturbances εu,t and εg,t. These elements together render the policy
problem nonlinear, since the disturbances will cause the nominal interest rate
to occasionally reach the lower bound.
The model without lower bound is analyzed in Clarida, Galí and Gertler
(1999). Without lower bound the policy problem is linear quadratic, so one can
solve for the equilibrium dynamics analytically using standard methods. Jung,
Teranishi, and Watanabe (2001) consider a model with lower bound but assume
perfect foresight. In their model the lower bound may be reached in t =0 , but
is never binding again some time onwards in the future. As is shown below,
the equilibrium of a stochastic economy diﬀers considerably from such a perfect
foresight solution, because shocks may always drive the economy back into a
situation with zero nominal interest rates.
2.1.2 How much non-linearity?
Instead of the fully nonlinear model, we study linear approximations to ﬁrms’
and households’ ﬁrst order conditions, i.e., equations (2) and (3), respectively,
and a quadratic approximation to the objective function, i.e., equation (1). This
means that the only nonlinearity that we take account of is the one imposed by
the zero lower bound (4).10
10Technically, this approach is equivalent to linearizing the ﬁrst order conditions of the non-
linear maximization problem around the ﬁrst best steady state except for the non-negativity
constraint for nominal interest rates that is kept in its original nonlinear form.
6Clearly, this modelling approach has advantages and disadvantages. One
disadvantage is that for the empirically relevant shock support and the estimated
value of the discount factor the linearizations (2) and (3) may perform poorly
at the lower bound. Yet, this depends on the degree of nonlinearity present in
the economy, an issue about which relatively little is empirically known.
A paramount advantage of our approach is that one can economize in the
dimension of the state space. A fully nonlinear setup would require an additional
state to keep track over time of the higher-order eﬀects of price dispersion, as
shown by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). Computational costs would become
prohibitive with such an additional state.11 A further advantage of focusing
solely on the nonlinearities induced by the lower bound is that one does not
have to parameterize higher order terms when calibrating the model. This seem
important, given the lack of empirical evidence on this matter.
Finally, the simpler setup implies that our results remain more easily compa-
rable to the standard linear-quadratic analysis without lower bound that appears
in the literature, as the only diﬀerence consists of imposing equation (4).
3S o l v i n g t h e M o d e l
This section shows how we solve the model under discretion. The solution
strategy for the case with policy commitment is illustrated in Adam and Billi
(2004).
We restrict attention to stationary Markov perfect equilibria in which the
policy functions depend on the current predetermined states ut and gt only.12 A
Markov perfect equilibrium consists of policy functions y(ut,g t), π(ut,g t),a n d
11With policy commitment the model has four state variables already, i.e., the two exogenous
shocks and the lagged values of the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (2) and (3), see Adam
and Billi (2004) for details.
12When considering a model with lagged inﬂation in the Phillips curve, as in section 8,
policy functions also depend on lagged inﬂation rates.
7i(ut,g t) that solve problem (1)-(8) when the expectations in equations (2) and
(3) are given by
Etπt+1 =
Z
π(ρuut + εu,t+1,ρ ggt + εg,t+1)f(εu,t+1,ε g,t+1)d(εu,t+1,ε g,t+1)
(10)
Etyt+1 =
Z
y(ρuut + εu,t+1,ρ ggt + εg,t+1)f(εu,t+1,ε g,t+1)d(εu,t+1,ε g,t+1)
(11)
where f(·,·) is the probability density function of the innovations (εu,ε g).
Equations (10) and (11) show that the solution to problem (1)-(8) enters
the constraints (2) and (3). Solving for the equilibrium thus requires ﬁnding a
ﬁxed-point in the space of policy functions.
We numerically solve for the ﬁxed-point as follows. We guess initial policy
functions, then compute the associated expectations in equations (10) and (11).
For given expectations, problem (1)-(8) is a simple static one-period maximiza-
tion problem, where the ﬁrst order conditions can be used to determine updated
policy functions. We iterate in this manner until convergence. The numerical
procedure is described in detail in appendix A.1.
4 Calibration to U.S. Economy
We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy employing the parameterization of
Adam and Billi (2004), which is based in turn on the results of Rotemberg and
Woodford (1998) and our estimates of the U.S. shock processes for the period
1983:1-2002:4. The parameter values are summarized in table 1 and serve as the
baseline calibration of the model. The implied steady state real interest rate for
this parameterization is 3.5% annually.
[Table 1 about here]
Throughout the paper variables are expressed in terms of percentage point
deviations from deterministic steady state values. Interest rates and inﬂation
8rates are expressed in annualized percentage deviations, while the real rate shock
and the mark-up shock are stated in quarterly percentages.
5 The Welfare Losses from Discretionary Policy
Using the baseline calibration from the previous section, table 2 reports the
welfare losses implied by discretionary policy.13 The table reports losses both
for a model with bound and for one ignoring the lower bound. Losses are ex-
pressed in terms of their welfare equivalent permanent consumption reduction.14
As is usually the case with New Keynesian models, e.g., Galí (2003), and rep-
resentative agent models more generally, e.g., Lucas (1987), the welfare losses
associated with cyclical ﬂuctuations turn out to be fairly small in absolute size.
Yet, important relative diﬀerences do show up.
[Table 2 about here]
As shown in the second column of table 2, under policy commitment the
consumption losses are almost independent of whether or not the zero lower
bound is taken into account by the model. We ﬁnd this to be a fairly robust
outcome. The situation diﬀers notably under discretionary policy, where the
consumption losses relative to the case with commitment increase by about 65%
once the zero lower bound is accounted for. This clariﬁes that one signiﬁcantly
understates the true welfare losses associated with discretionary monetary policy
if ignoring the existence of a lower bound on nominal interest rates.
Depending on the precise model parameterization, the understatement of the
consumption losses may turn out to be even larger. This is illustrated in ﬁgure
1, which reports the increase in the consumption losses associated with taking
13The table reports unconditional welfare losses, obtained by averaging the discounted losses
across 1000 simulations each 1000 periods long.
14Consumption equivalents are obtained via an appropriate transformation of the losses
from objective (1), see appendix A.2.
9into account the zero lower bound under discretionary policy, as a function of
the steady state real interest rate.15 It shows that already for steady state real
interest rates slightly below the baseline value of 3.5%, the true consumption
loss generated by discretionary policy may be as much as 300% higher than
suggested instead by a model ignoring the zero lower bound.
[Figure 1 about here]
The dependence of the size of the consumption losses on the steady state real
interest rate, displayed in ﬁgure 1, suggests that the lower bound inﬂicts sizable
welfare losses under discretionary policy whenever the natural real interest rate
is low, i.e., for low values of the real rate shock gt. The next sections investigate
this issue in greater detail.
6P e r f e c t F o r e s i g h t
To gain intuition for the numerical ﬁndings reported above, this section assumes
perfect foresight and analytically determines the Markov perfect equilibrium
associated with discretionary monetary policy. Analysis of the stochastic case
is deferred to the next section.
For simplicity, we abstract from time variations in the mark-up shock ut
and focus on variations of the real rate shock gt only.16 To characterize the
discretionary equilibrium deﬁne for the real rate shock a critical value
gc = −σr∗ (12)
15The steady state real interest rate is varied by changing the discount factor β.I n s t e a d ,a l l
other parameters take on their baseline values from table 1. For a steady state real interest rate
below 3.29% our algorithm for computing the optimal discretionary policy fails to converge.
16For the baseline calibration of table 1, our numerical simulations show that mark-up
shocks do not drive the higher welfare losses associated with taking proper account of the
lower bound.
10and partition the real line into a number of non-intersecting intervals
I0 =[ gc,+∞)
Ij =[ gc/
¡
ρg
¢j ,gc/
¡
ρg
¢j−1) for j =1 ,2,3...
Under perfect foresight these intervals have the convenient property that if gt ∈
Ij then gt+1 ∈ Ij−1 for all j>0.T h ei n t e r v a lI0 is an absorbing interval that
is reached in ﬁnite time for any initial value g0.
In appendix A.3 the following result is shown:
Proposition 1 Suppose εu,t = εg,t =0and u0 =0 .T h e r e e x i s t s a M a r k o v
perfect equilibrium with perfect foresight such that
i =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1
σgf o r g ≥ gc
−r∗ for g <gc (13)
and in which output and inﬂation are continuous functions of g.F o r g ∈ I0
output and inﬂation are equal to zero. For g ∈ Ij (j>0) output and inﬂation
are negative and linearly increasing in g at a rate that increases with j.
Figure 2 displays the equilibrium for the case with lower bound (solid line)
and without lower bound (dashed line with circles), when using the U.S. baseline
calibration of table 1.17 When ignoring the lower bound real rate shocks do
not generate any policy trade-oﬀ. The policymaker replicates variations in the
natural real rate by adjusting nominal interest rates appropriately.
[Figure 2 about here]
Instead, with lower bound it remains optimal to mimic this policy as long
as the lower bound is not reached, but to set nominal interest rates to zero once
the natural real rate drops below the critical value gc. Yet, when this happens
output falls short of potential and inﬂation becomes negative. This occurs
17For this calibration gc ≈− 5.47.
11because of the lower bound real interest rates are higher than their eﬃcient
level.
Figure 2 also shows that, as stated in proposition 1, the eﬀects of a marginal
reduction of g on output and inﬂation are increasing as the real rate becomes
more negative. More negative values of g imply the lower bound is reached also
in the future. This induces expectations of negative output and inﬂation, which
reinforce the downward pressure on current output and inﬂation associated with
too high real interest rates, see equations (2) and (3).
This ﬁnding can explain the dependence of the welfare loss on the steady
state real interest rate, illustrated earlier in ﬁgure 1. A lower steady state real
interest rate r∗ leads to an increase in the critical value gc, see equation (12),
and causes output losses and negative inﬂation rates over a wider range of real
rate shocks. None of these losses show up in a model that ignores the existence
of the zero lower bound.
7 Stochastic Equilibrium
This section presents the stochastic Markov perfect equilibrium with lower
bound corresponding to the baseline parameterization in table 1. In partic-
ular, we ﬁnd that the presence of shocks leads to signiﬁcant diﬀerences from the
case with perfect foresight considered in the previous section.
7.1 Impact on Average Values
We ﬁrst discuss the eﬀect of the zero lower bound on average output and inﬂa-
tion under discretionary policy. Since the lower bound causes the model to be
nonlinear, the average values of endogenous variables will generally diﬀer from
their steady state values due to a breakdown of certainty equivalence.
[Figure 3 about here]
12The perfect foresight solution presented earlier in section 6 suggests that both
average output and inﬂation should fall short of their steady state value of zero.
Figure 3 depicts the average values of output and inﬂation under discretionary
policy at diﬀerent levels of the steady state real interest rate.18 As suggested by
the perfect foresight solution, there is more deﬂation on average as the steady
state real interest rate falls. Surprisingly, however, average output is above
potential, unlike suggested by ﬁgure 2 for the case with perfect foresight.
The origin of these results is clariﬁed in the next section, which looks at the
stochastic equilibrium in greater detail.
7.2 Equilibrium Response to Shocks
We ﬁrst discuss the response to mark-up shocks and then discuss that to real
rate shocks.
We ﬁnd that the zero lower bound does not represent a binding constraint
in the model when dealing with mark-up shocks. The empirical variability of
these shocks is simply too small for the policy constraint to matter. Figure
4 displays the equilibrium response of output, inﬂation, and nominal interest
rates to mark-up shocks.19 The solid line corresponds to the optimal responses
if the bound is considered, while the dashed line refers to the case where the
lower bound is ignored. The ﬁgure shows that the optimal reaction to mark-up
shocks is virtually unaﬀected by the presence of the zero lower bound. Moreover,
interest rates remain well above their lower bound, even for very negative values
of the mark-up shock.
[Figure 4 about here]
18The steady state interest rate is varied by changing the discount factor β.A l l o t h e r
parameters take on their baseline values from table 1.
19The ﬁgure depicts responses over a range of ±3 unconditional standard deviations of the
mark-up shock; with the value of the real rate shock set equal to zero.
13The situation diﬀers notably when considering real-rate shocks. Figure 5
depicts the equilibrium response of output, inﬂation, and nominal rates to a
real rate shock.20 The solid line corresponds to the stochastic case while the
dashed line corresponds to the case with perfect foresight, considered in section
6. The ﬁgure reveals a number of interesting features.
[Figure 5 about here]
First, while large negative values of the real rate shock result in negative
output gaps and deﬂation, these eﬀects are much more pronounced in the sto-
chastic case. Compared to the case with perfect foresight, both the maximum
output losses and deﬂation approximately triple.
Second, the zero lower bound is now reached much earlier than under per-
fect foresight, since interest rates are lowered more aggressively in response to
n e g a t i v er e a lr a t es h o c k s .F o ro u rb a s e l i n ec a l i b r a t i o nt h ep r e s e n c eo ft h el o w e r
bound might require setting nominal interest rates up to 75 basis points lower
than under perfect foresight.
Third, ﬁgure 5 reveals that the output gap becomes slightly positive and
inﬂation slightly negative well before the zero lower bound is reached. Thus
real rate shocks generate a policy trade oﬀ even at times where nominal interest
rates are still positive.
All these features emerge because in a fully stochastic setup shocks may
drive the economy from a situation with positive nominal interest rates into one
where the lower bound is reached. Since output and inﬂation become negative
once at zero nominal rates, the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the
future causes agents to reduce their expectations of future output and inﬂation
20The ﬁgure displays the responses up to a −3 unconditional standard deviation value of
the real rate shock; assuming mark-up shocks to be at zero.
14well before interest rates are at the lower bound.21 The reduction in expected
output and inﬂation is isomorphic to a negative mark-up shock and a negative
real rate shock in equations (2) and (3), respectively. To both these shocks
the policymaker responds by lowering nominal interest rates. This explains the
more aggressive reduction of interest rates in the lower panel of ﬁgure 5.
Negative mark-up shocks, however, generate a policy trade-oﬀ and policy
responds to them by letting output rise and inﬂation fall, see ﬁgure 4. The
downward bias in expectations, therefore, also explains the output boom that
can be observed in the ‘run-up’ to zero nominal rates in ﬁgure 5, i.e., before gt
enters the binding area. This output boom compensates for the output losses
occurring for more negative shock values and explains why in the stochastic case
there is virtually no distortion of the average output level, see ﬁgure 3.
Finally, the downward bias of expected future values of output and inﬂation,
due to the presence of shocks, generates downward pressure for corresponding
actual values. This in turn justiﬁes even lower expectations. This comple-
mentarity between expectations and outcomes explains the large diﬀerences in
magnitudes implied by the perfect foresight equilibrium and the stochastic equi-
librium.
7.3 Comparison to the case with commitment
This section brieﬂy summarizes results derived in Adam and Billi (2004), and
explains why under commitment taking into account the existence of the zero
lower bound does not generate large welfare consequences.
[Figure 6 about here]
Figure 6 displays the average values of output and inﬂation as a function of
the steady state real interest rate. Unlike in the case with discretion, average
21Technically, since the policy functions of output and inﬂation depicted in ﬁgure 2 are
concave, Jensen’s inequality implies a downward bias once we allow for uncertainty about the
future value of the natural real rate.
15inﬂation does not fall as the level of the real interest rate is lower. For very low
levels of the real interest rate the average inﬂation rate even becomes slightly
positive. This suggests that under commitment output and inﬂation fall much
less in response to a negative real rate shock.
[Figure 7 about here]
This point is illustrated in ﬁgure 7 which depicts the equilibrium response
of output and inﬂation to a negative real rate shock. The solid line shows the
responses under commitment, while the dashed line corresponds to the case with
discretion. The diﬀerence in the responses of output and inﬂation is sizable. It
emerges because under commitment the policymaker can engage in (credible)
promises about the conduct of monetary policy in the future. In particular, once
the lower bound is reached, the policymaker promises to allow for some inﬂation
in the future. This raises expectations of future inﬂation, which reduces real
interest rates and helps stabilizing current inﬂation and output. Since the inﬂa-
tion promises fail to be time-consistent, they are unavailable to a discretionary
policymaker.
8 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we report the results of robustness exercises regarding the model
speciﬁcation and parameterization.
8.1 Hybrid Phillips Curve
In the benchmark model considered thus far inﬂation is assumed to be purely
forward-looking. Yet, a number of econometric studies suggest that inﬂation is
partly determined by lagged inﬂation rates, e.g., Galí and Gertler (1999).
This section studies the implications of allowing inﬂation to depend on lagged
inﬂation rates. In particular, we replace the forward-looking Phillips curve (2)
16by its ‘hybrid’ version
πt =
1
1+βγ
[βEtπt+1 + γπt−1 + κyt + ut] (14)
where γ ≥ 0 is an ‘indexation parameter’ that indicates the degree to which ﬁrms
automatically adjust their prices to lagged inﬂation rates when they do not fully
reoptimize prices, see Woodford (2003). Correspondingly, we also replace the
objective function (1) by
−E0
∞ X
i=0
β
i ¡
(πt+i − γπt+i−1)2 + λy2
t+i
¢
(15)
which Woodford (2003) shows to be a second order approximation to the house-
hold’s utility function when the Phillips curve is given by equation (14).
To economize on the number of the state variables we abstract from mark-up
shocks in the model, i.e., we set ut ≡ 0 in equation (14).22 This simpliﬁcation
implies welfare losses emerge only if the lower bound is taken into account,
independently of the degree of indexation.23 For γ =0the policy problem
reduces to the simpler case considered in the previous sections, except for the
fact that we now abstract from mark-up shocks. For γ>0 inﬂation is partly
determined by lagged inﬂation, which becomes an endogenous state variable
of the system. Solving the policy problem is then more involved, since the
discretionary maximization problem fails to be static.
We consider stationary Markov-perfect equilibria where output, inﬂation,
and nominal interest rates depend on the exogenous shocks (u,g) and also on
the lagged inﬂation rate π−1. The current policymaker behaves as a Stackel-
berg leader and rationally anticipates how future equilibrium values respond to
current inﬂation outcomes. Constraint (8) thus has to be replaced by
{y(st+i),π(st+i),i(st+i)} given for i ≥ 1,w h e r est+i =( ut+i,g t+i,πt+i−1)
(16)
22An additional state variable would raise the dimension of the state space of the model to
ﬁve in the case with commitment. Computational costs would thus be prohibitive.
23When ignoring the lower bound, the optimal policy response to real rate shocks is time-
consistent. Discretionary monetary policy then does not generate welfare losses.
17Appendix A.4 illustrates the numerical algorithm we employ to solve the
model under discretion, based on a value function representation of the policy
problem. It can be seen as a generalization to a nonlinear setup of the technique
described in Söderlind (1999). Instead, the solution strategy for solving the
policy problem under commitment is described in Billi (2004).
[Figure 8 about here]
Figure 8 depicts the steady state consumption losses from discretionary pol-
icy associated with various degrees of indexation γ.24 The consumption losses
are expressed in terms of the percentage increase relative to the loss without
indexation (γ =0 ). As shown, the consumption losses are strongly increasing in
t h ed e g r e eo fi n d e x a t i o n ,e . g . ,w i t hγ =0 .16, the loss from discretionary policy
is almost 300% higher than in the case without indexation.25
[Figure 9 about here]
Moreover, ﬁgure 9 compares the equilibrium responses for the purely forward-
looking case (solid line) to the case where γ =0 .16 (dashed line). Endogenous
inﬂation persistence signiﬁcantly increases the amount of deﬂation and the size
of output losses associated with negative values of the real rate shock. Also,
the policymaker has to ease monetary policy even more aggressively than in a
purely forward-looking speciﬁc a t i o n .T h i si si nl i n ew i t hﬁndings by Coenen et
al. (2004) and Wolman (2005) who report that interest rate rules that stabi-
lize the inﬂation rate lead to signiﬁcant real distortions whenever price or wage
setting frictions impart inertia to the inﬂation rate.
Overall, this suggests that endogenous inﬂation persistence considerably re-
inforces the results obtained for the purely forward-looking model: by ignoring
the zero lower bound one understates the value of monetary commitment.
24The ﬁgure uses the baseline values from table 1 for the remaining parameters.
25For values of γ larger than 0.16 our numerical algorithm for computing the optimal dis-
cretionary policy then fails to converge.
188.2 Lower Interest Rate Elasticity of Output
Our benchmark calibration of table 1 assumes an interest rate elasticity of out-
put of σ =6 .25, which seems to lie on the high side for plausible estimates of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution.26 Therefore, we also consider a calibra-
tion with σ =1 , that corresponds to log utility in consumption, and constitutes
the usual benchmark parameterization in the real business cycle literature. This
calibration is taken from our companion paper, see Adam and Billi (2004), and
is summarized in table 3.
[Tables 3 and 4 about here]
Table 4 reports the consumption equivalent welfare losses associated with
discretionary monetary policy. As for the benchmark calibration, losses remain
almost unchanged when taking into account the zero lower bound under com-
mitment. The losses under discretion, however, increase markedly. The increase
is much stronger than for the benchmark calibration because for σ =1the data
imply a slightly more variable natural real rate process. This causes the lower
bound to be reached more often.
9 Conclusions and Outlook
We show that taking explicitly into account the existence of the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates considerably increases the welfare costs associated with
discretionary monetary policy. In particular, low values of the natural real rate
of interest cause larger much output losses and stronger deﬂa t i o nt h a ni nt h ec a s e
with policy commitment. Importantly, none of these feature is appropriately
accounted for by models that ignore the lower bound.
In the benchmark New Keynesian model that we employ, once the lower
bound is reached the inability to commit to future policy actions deprives discre-
tionary monetary policymakers of their policy instruments. However, in practice
26As argued by Woodford (2003), a high elasticity value may capture non-modeled interest-
rate-sensitive investment demand.
19there are several alternative policy instruments that might still be available in
a situation of zero nominal interest rates, most notably ﬁscal policy and ex-
change rate policy. We plan to investigate the relevance of these other policy
instruments by including them into our analysis in future work.
A Appendix
A.1 Numerical algorithm (forward-looking Phillips curve)
To solve problem (1)-(8), we deﬁne a grid of N interpolation nodes over the state
space (u,g) ⊂ R2 and evaluate policy functions y(u,g), π(u,g),a n di(u,g) at
intermediate values resorting to linear interpolation. The expectations deﬁned
by equations (10) and (11) are evaluated at each interpolation node using an M
node Gaussian-Hermite quadrature scheme.27 Our numerical algorithm consists
of the following steps:
Step 1: Choose the degree of approximation N and M and assign the interpolation
and quadrature nodes. Guess initial values for the policy functions y0, π0,
and i0 at the interpolation nodes.
Step 2: At each interpolation node compute the expectations (10) and (11) implied
by the current guess yk, πk,a n dik.T h e ne m p l o yt h eﬁrst order conditions
of (1)-(8) to derive a new guess for the policy functions in the following
way. At each interpolation node, ﬁrst assume i>−r∗.T h e ﬁrst order
conditions then imply the well-known ‘targeting rule’
π = −
λ
κ
y (17)
This together with (2) delivers the implied values for y and π. Plugging
these into (3) determines the value of i.I fi>−r∗, as initially conjectured,
one has found a solution. Otherwise, set i = −r∗ and solve (2) and (3) for
27See chapter 7 in Judd (1998) for details.
20y and π. Performing this at each node delivers a new guess yk+1, πk+1,
and ik+1.
Step 3: Stop if max
©¯ ¯yk − yk+1¯ ¯
max ,
¯ ¯πk − πk+1¯ ¯
max ,
¯ ¯ik − ik+1¯ ¯
max
ª
<τwhere
|·|max denotes the maximum absolute norm and τ>0 the convergence
tolerance level. Otherwise repeat step 2.
In our application we set N = 275 and M =9 . Relatively more nodes
are placed in areas of the state space where the policy functions display kinks,
i.e., at negative values of the g shock where the lower bound is reached. The
support of the interpolation nodes is chosen to cover ±4 unconditional standard
deviations for each of the exogenous shocks. Our initial guess for the policies
is set to the solution of the problem without zero lower bound. The tolerance
level is τ =1 .49 · 10−8, i.e., the square root of machine precision.
A.2 Computing welfare equivalent consumption losses
The results in chapter 6 of Woodford (2003) show that a second order approxi-
mation of the representative agent’s discounted utility is given by
U = −YU cL
where Y denotes steady state output, Uc > 0 steady state marginal utility of
consumption, and
L =
1
2
αθ (1 + ωθ)
(1 − α)(1− αβ)
∞ X
i=0
β
i ¡
π2
t+i + λy2
t+i
¢
(18)
Note that, up to a change in sign, the inﬁnite sum appearing in the previous
expression corresponds to the discounted loss (1).
Assuming a permanent reduction in consumption by p ≥ 0 percent, a second
order approximation of the utility loss generated is given by
1
1 − β
µ
−UcY
p
100
+ Ucc
³
Y
p
100
´2¶
= −
UcY
1 − β
µ
p
100
−
UccY
Uc
³ p
100
´2¶
= −
UcY
1 − β
µ
p
100
+
1
σ
³ p
100
´2¶
21where Ucc < 0 is the second derivative of utility with respect to consumption
evaluated at the steady state. Equating this utility loss to U delivers
1
σ
³ p
100
´2
+
p
100
− (1 − β)L =0
The utility equivalent percentage loss in steady state consumption is then
p = 100 · σ
−1+
q
1+
4(1−β)L
σ
2
S i n c ew ee x p r e s sy and π in percentage points, we have to rescale the losses and
use
p = 100 · σ
−1+
q
1+
4(1−β)L
σ1002
2
(19)
Analogous arguments apply for the model with a hybrid Phillips curve. Equa-
tion (19) then still applies, but (18) is substituted with
L =
1
2
αθ(1 + ωθ)
(1 − α)(1− αβ)
"
∞ X
i=0
β
i
³
(πt+i − γπt+i−1)
2 + λy2
t+i
´#
A.3 Proof of proposition 1
Suppose g ∈ I0,t h e ng0 ∈ I0 where g0 denotes the value of g in the subsequent
period. Given the interest rate policy (13), equations (2) and (3) imply that
π = y =0constitutes a perfect foresight equilibrium for all g ∈ I0. Clearly, the
interest rate policy (13) is optimal for all g ∈ I0.
Now suppose g ∈ I1. Since this implies g0 ∈ I0,w ec a ns o l v et h ep r o b l e m
by backward induction: g0 ∈ I0 implies private sector’s expectations are given
by Eπ0 = Ey0 =0 . It then follows from equations (2), (3), and (13) that
y = −gc + g (20)
π = −κgc + κg (21)
Note that output and inﬂation are continuous in the transition from I1 to I0,
and linear in g for g ∈ I1. One can iterate in this manner to obtain output and
22inﬂation for I2,I3,.... Continuity and linearity of all equations involved thereby
implies that output and inﬂation are continuous functions of g.M o r e o v e r ,f o r
the stated interest rate policy, in each interval Ij output and inﬂation are linear
in g and can be represented as
y = cj
y + sj
yg (22)
π = cj
π + sj
πg (23)
Equations (20) and (21) imply
⎛
⎝ s1
y
s1
π
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝ 1
κ
⎞
⎠
Using equations (22) and (23) and the law of motion of g to construct expec-
tations in the interval Ij+1, equations (2) and (3) and the interest rate policy
gives
⎛
⎝ sj+1
y
sj+1
π
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝ s1
y
s1
π
⎞
⎠ + A
⎛
⎝ sj
y
sj
π
⎞
⎠ where
A =
⎛
⎝ ρg σρg
ρgκρ g (κσ + β)
⎞
⎠
Iterating on this equation implies that
s2 = s1 + As1
s3 = s2 + A2s1
s4 = s3 + A3s1
. . .
where
sj ≡
⎛
⎝ sj
y
sj
π
⎞
⎠
Given that s1 > 0 and all entries in A are positive, the slopes sj are increasing
in j. Since output and inﬂation are negative for g ∈ I1, from continuity it follows
that they are negative for all g ∈ Ij with j>1. Therefore, zero nominal interest
rates are optimal for g ∈ Ij with j>1, since positive nominal interest rates
would generate even lower output levels and inﬂation rates.
23A.4 Numerical algorithm (hybrid Phillips curve)
We deﬁne a grid of N interpolation nodes over the state space (u,g,π−1) ⊂
R3. Associated with the policy functions π(u,g,π−1) and y(u,g,π−1) are the
expectation functions
Eπ+1 =
Z
π(ρuu + εu,+1,ρ gg + εg,+1,π)f(εu,+1,ε g,+1)d(εu,+1,ε g,+1) (24)
Ey+1 =
Z
y(ρuu + εu,+1,ρ gg + εg,+1,π)f(εu,+1,ε g,+1)d(εu,+1,ε g,+1) (25)
where f(·,·) is the probability density function of the stochastic shock innova-
tions (εu,ε g). The expectations (24) and (25) are evaluated at each interpolation
node using an M node Gaussian-Hermite quadrature scheme.28 Our numerical
algorithm then performs the following steps:
Step 1: Choose the degree of approximation N and M and assign the interpolation
and quadrature nodes. Guess initial values for the policy functions y0, π0,
and i0 at the interpolation nodes.
Step 2: At each interpolation node compute the expectations (24) and (25) implied
by the current guess yk, πk,a n dik. For given expectation functions, the
Lagrangian for maximizing (15) subject to (3)-(7), (14) and (16) can be
written as a recursive saddle point problem
V k(u,g,π−1)= m a x
(y,π,i)
min
(m1,m2)
hk(u,g,π−1,y,π,i,m 1,m 2,Ekπ+1,Eky+1)
+ βEV k(u+1,g +1,π) (26)
s.t.
i ≥− r∗
u+1 = ρuu + εu,+1
g+1 = ρgg + εg,+1
28See chapter 7 in Judd (1998) for details.
24where
hk(·)=−π2 − λy2 + m1[π −
1
1+βγ
(βEkπ+1 + γπ−1 + κy + u)]
+ m2
£
y − Eky+1 + σ
¡
i − Ekπ
¢
− g
¤
and m1 and m2 are the Lagrange multipliers. Using the collocation
method one can numerically solve for the ﬁxed-point of (26) and the as-
sociated optimal policy functions yk+1, πk+1, ik+1, m
k+1
1 , m
k+1
2 .D e t a i l s
of this procedure are described, e.g., in appendix A.2 in our companion
paper, see Adam and Billi (2004).
Step 3: Stop if the maximum of
¯ ¯yk − yk+1¯ ¯
max,
¯ ¯πk − πk+1¯ ¯
max,
¯ ¯ik − ik+1¯ ¯
max,
¯ ¯mk
1 − m
k+1
1
¯ ¯
max and
¯ ¯mk
2 − m
k+1
2
¯ ¯
max is smaller than τ, where |·|max de-
notes the maximum absolute norm evaluated at the interpolation nodes
and τ>0 the convergence tolerance level. Otherwise repeat step 2.
In our application we set N = 1375 and M =9 . Relatively more nodes
are placed in areas of the state space where the value and policy functions
display a higher degree of curvature and kinks, respectively. The support of the
interpolation nodes is chosen to cover ±4 unconditional standard deviations for
each of the exogenous shocks, and to insure that all values of π−1 lie inside the
state space when using the solution to perform stochastic simulations. Since
this can only be veriﬁed after the solution is achieved some experimentation is
necessary. Our initial guess for the polices is set to the solution of the model
without zero lower bound. The tolerance level is τ =1 .49·10−8, i.e., the square
root of machine precision.
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28Parameter Economic interpretation Assigned value
β quarterly discount factor
³
1+3.5%
4
´−1
≈ 0.9913
σ real rate elasticity of output 6.25
α share of ﬁrms keeping prices ﬁxed 0.66
θ price elasticity of demand 7.66
ω elasticity of ﬁrms’ marginal costs 0.47
κ slope of the Phillips curve 0.024
λ weight on output in the loss function 0.048
42 =0 .003
ρu AR-coeﬃcient mark-up shocks 0
ρg AR-coeﬃcient real rate shocks 0.8
σu s.d. mark-up shock innovations (quarterly %) 0.154
σg s.d. real rate shock innovations (quarterly %) 1.524
Table 1: Parameter values (baseline calibration)
Consumption equivalents Loss under Loss under Additional loss
(in percent) commitment discretion from discretion
Without zero bound -0.0152 -0.0197 -0.0045
With zero bound -0.0153 -0.0228 -0.0075
Increase in additional loss +65%
Table 2: Welfare equivalent consumption losses from discretion (baseline calibration)
29Parameter Economic interpretation Assigned value
β quarterly discount factor
³
1+3.5%
4
´−1
≈ 0.9913
σ real rate elasticity of output 1
α share of ﬁrms keeping prices ﬁxed 0.66
θ price elasticity of demand 7.66
ω elasticity of ﬁrms’ marginal costs 0.47
κ slope of the Phillips curve 0.057
λ weight on output in the loss function 0.007
ρu AR-coeﬃcient mark-up shocks 0.36
ρg AR-coeﬃcient real rate shocks 0.8
σu s.d. mark-up shock innovations (quarterly %) 0.171
σg s.d. real rate shock innovations (quarterly %) 0.294
Table 3: Parameter values (RBC calibration)
Consumption equivalents Loss under Loss under Additional loss
(in percent) commitment discretion from discretion
Without zero bound -0.0258 -0.0400 -0.0142
With zero bound -0.0259 -0.0668 -0.0408
Increase in additional loss +189 %
Table 4: Welfare equivalent consumption losses from discretion (RBC calibration)
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Figure 1: Increase in consumption losses taking into account the zero lower
bound (discretionary policy)
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Figure 2: Perfect foresight equilibrium (discretionary policy)
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Figure 3: Average values (discretionary policy)
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Figure 4: Equilibrium response to mark-up shocks (discretionary policy)
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Figure 5: Equilibrium response to real-rate shocks (discretionary policy)
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Figure 6: Average values (commitment policy)
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Figure 7: Equilibrium response to real rate shocks (commitment vs. discre-
tionary policy)
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Figure 8: Increase in consumption losses from indexation to lagged inﬂation
(discretionary policy)
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Figure 9: Equilibrium response to real rate shocks with indexation to lagged
inﬂation (discretionary policy)
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